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expressions
Francesco Marchi* and Albert Newen
Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Do our background beliefs, desires, and mental images influence our perceptual
experience of the emotions of others? In this paper, we will address the possibility of
cognitive penetration (CP) of perceptual experience in the domain of social cognition.
In particular, we focus on emotion recognition based on the visual experience of
facial expressions. After introducing the current debate on CP, we review examples of
perceptual adaptation for facial expressions of emotion. This evidence supports the idea
that facial expressions are perceptually processed as wholes. That is, the perceptual
system integrates lower-level facial features, such as eyebrow orientation, mouth angle
etc., into facial compounds. We then present additional experimental evidence showing
that in some cases, emotion recognition on the basis of facial expression is sensitive
to and modified by the background knowledge of the subject. We argue that such
sensitivity is best explained as a difference in the visual experience of the facial
expression, not just as a modification of the judgment based on this experience. The
difference in experience is characterized as the result of the interference of background
knowledge with the perceptual integration process for faces. Thus, according to the
best explanation, we have to accept CP in some cases of emotion recognition. Finally,
we discuss a recently proposed mechanism for CP in the face-based recognition of
emotion.
Keywords: cognitive penetrability, emotion recognition, adaptation, facial expressions, social perception
Introduction: What is Cognitive Penetration? Does it Really
Occur?
Cognitive penetrability is a phenomenon that occurs if higher-level cognitive states, such as beliefs,
desires, intentions, etc., can directly influence perceptual experience. In other words, if cognitive
penetration (CP) takes place, what one, believes, desires, intends, etc., may alter what one sees, hears,
etc. It is currently a matter of debate whether such a phenomenon occurs and, if it does, under which
circumstances it is to be expected and how it is to be characterized. A definition of CP is offered by
Stokes (2013):
(CP) A perceptual experience E is cognitively penetrated if and only if (1) E is causally
dependent on some cognitive state C and (2) the causal link between E and C is internal and
mental. (Stokes, 2013, p. 650)
We shall adopt this definition as a starting point. The main advantage of the definition is that by
emphasizing that the relevant link between C and E must be internal and mental, it clearly excludes
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instances of bodily movement and changes in non-mental bodily
states from the domain of CP. In this section, we introduce the
current debate on CP and review some of the reasons for thinking
that such a phenomenon occurs, before exploring its possible
consequences for the realm of social cognition.
In the twentieth century, the possibility of CP was the core
idea behind the new look movement in psychology, which
studied several alleged cases, albeit without appeal to the precise
notion of CP (Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Bruner and Postman,
1949). Later, the idea was almost abandoned in the light of
severe criticisms from Fodor (1984, 1988) and Pylyshyn (1984,
1999), who were concerned with the characterization of a
reliable visual system that is capable of representing the world
adequately, i.e., of delivering some true information. Fodor
(1984, 1988) and Pylyshyn (1984, 1999), who introduced the
current terminology of penetrability, think of vision as a serial
bottom-up process that, roughly, encompasses stimulus onset
to categorization. Accordingly, they present several arguments
against the possibility of CP. One famous example is Fodor’s
argument about the impenetrability of visual illusions such as
the Müller-Lyer illusion (see below). Driven by the consideration
that in order to function quickly and reliably, part of the
visual system must work independently of any other cognitive
subsystem and domain, Pylyshyn (1999) describes a functionally
characterized early visual system that he calls early vision (EV),
and he reviews several forms of psychological evidencemotivating
the proposed move. Raftopoulos (2014) has argued for EV on
neurophysiological grounds, offering a temporal characterization
of EV as the first 100 ms of visual processing. He is led by
the observation that there is as yet very little evidence of any
top-down modulation of the visual system from areas higher
in the brain’s cortical hierarchy during this time period. Hence,
according to Fodor, Pylyshyn, and Raftopoulos, a significant
part of the visual system, and, by extension, its counterparts
in other sensory modalities must be considered to be modular
in a strong sense. Part of the visual system is domain-specific,
an inborn system that can only be influenced by inner-sensory
information. It follows from this last point that the processes of
the primary visual system cannot be influenced by non-perceptual
information. This is especially the case with regard to higher-level
cognitive information like background beliefs or mental images.
This is the core idea of cognitive impenetrability.
As previously mentioned, one central observation offered in
support of the impenetrability thesis is the Müller-Lyer illusion:
even if we know that the two arrows have the same length, we
continue to perceive one as being shorter than the other. Our
perceptual experience seems to be impenetrable to our knowledge
of the line’s length. However, some researchers have recently
challenged the impenetrability claim, observing that in some
cultures the illusion does not arise (MacCauley and Henrich,
2006). How can we account for this? One could describe this as
a case of long-term adaptation, or of perceptual learning effects
that remain intra-perceptual. But how could this modification
of perceptual processing take place? The reasoning behind the
objection to the impenetrability argument is, roughly, that people
who live in highly carpentered environments may develop a
form of implicit perceptual knowledge about edges, corners,
and relative distances of geometrical displays that determine
the illusion, since the phenomenon is not observed (or is
observed to a lesser degree) in cultures that live in non-
carpentered environments. Such implicit knowledge is connected
to development and long term perceptual interaction between
subjects and their environment and, as such, may be relatively
stable and not easily overwritten by the currently entertained
belief that the two lines are equal. However, if it is indeed a
form of knowledge that determines the illusion, under certain
assumptions the Müller-Lyer case can be considered evidence of
long-term (diachronic) CP.
Pylyshyn also allows for two kinds of interactions between
perception and cognition that are compatible with his
impenetrability claim. Specifically, higher-level cognitive
information may either influence attention, thereby modifying
the input to the visual system, ormodify the output of the primary
visual system after EV has done its work. Both alternatives leave
EV impenetrable. Pylyshyn writes:
“Our hypothesis is that cognition intervenes in determining
the nature of perception at only two loci. In other words,
the influence of cognition upon vision is constrained in
how and where it can operate. These two loci are: (a) in
the allocation of attention to certain locations or certain
properties prior to the operation of early vision [: : :] (b)
in the decisions involved in recognizing and identifying
patterns after the operation of early vision. Such a stagemay
(or in some cases must) access background knowledge as
it pertains to the interpretation of a particular stimulus.”
(Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 344)
Therefore, in arguing against the impenetrability view, the
principal challenge is to present convincing cases where the
influence cannot be explained with reference to either of the
strategies proposed by Pylyshyn, and to show that cognitive
information modifies the primary visual system.
In the last decade, there has been a substantial increase in the
literature describing in detail those aspects of brain architecture
that are compatible with CP. Hard-wired bottom-up mechanisms
are not found in the brain: perception is much more interactive
and far-reaching in several respects: (i) concerning connectivity,
there are many more feedback connections from higher cognitive
areas to the primary visual cortex than feedforward connections
to higher cognitive areas (e.g., Salin and Bullier, 1995); (ii)
concerning timing, there is evidence to suggest that the timing
allows for an early activation of brain areas that, if the bottom-
up processing view were correct, should only be activated later.
The time course of visual processes in V1 and V2 is such that
we cannot presuppose simple serial feedforward processing. For
example, in the processing of images eliciting perception of
illusory contours, the activation of V1 caused by illusory contours
emerges 100 ms after stimulus onset in the superficial layers of
V1, and at around 120–190 ms in the deep layers of V1. However,
in V2, the illusory contour response begins earlier, occurring at
70 ms in the superficial layers and at 95 ms in the deep layers
(Lee and Nguyen, 2001). Thus, we must presuppose an interactive
temporal dynamics. Furthermore, Bar (2003, 2009) argues that the
prefrontal cortex can be activated very early in the processing of
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a stimulus and its context, and that it can interact top-down with
the visual processing of that stimulus before its completion. Thus,
a purely bottom-up view of visual processing is not correct if we
adhere to classical views about visual areas like V1 to V5, and
nor can such a view adequately account for the relation between
ventral visual areas and the prefrontal cortex. We will come back
to this issue when speculating about the mechanism of CP. The
available evidence so far indicates that CP is a physiological
possibility. Having established that CP is physiologically possible,
we will now present evidence from empirical studies that cannot
be adequately explained without relying on CP.
Core Examples in the Debate
Macpherson (2012) reviews an experiment (Levin and Banaji,
2006)1 in which knowledge and expectations about the race and
skin color of human faces biases a perceptual color-matching task.
There are four versions of the experiment. We cannot present
all of these in detail (but see Macpherson, 2012; Stokes and
Bergeron, 2015, for further discussion). For present purposes,
we will focus on the second version, which we take to be the
least controversial. Subjects had to adjust a uniform patch of
gray to the color of a computer generated target face, which was
averaged to display ambiguous facial traits between prototypical
African-American and Caucasian faces. The ambiguous face was
presented next to either a prototypical African-American or
Caucasian face, and all the stimuli were adjusted to the exact
same color (surface lightness). The African-American faces and
the Caucasian faces were labeled, respectively, “BLACK” and
“WHITE,” while the ambiguous face was labeled either “BLACK”
or “WHITE,” depending upon whether it was presented next
to the Caucasian or African-American face respectively. The
experimenters found that even when subjects were presented
with the same target stimulus, namely the ambiguous face, they
adjusted the patch of gray to a darker shade when it was labeled
“BLACK” and to a lighter shade when labeled “WHITE.” The
take of the experimenters on this result was that the subject’s
knowledge and expectations about the skin-tone associated with
a certain race, as triggered by the label, altered their perceptual
experience of the color of the target ambiguous face. This
experiment has the advantage of requiring the subjects to perform
an on-line perceptual-matching task, i.e., the results are not based
on subjects’ reports or introspections. This methodology aims to
rule out several alternative explanations to CP, such as cognitive
influences on the subject’s post-perceptual judgments or pre-
perceptual attentional shifts.
Stokes (2014) reports an experiment with a very similar
methodology performed by Witzel et al. (2011). Experimenters
found that when strongly color-biasing shapes (e.g., a Smurf or
a Coca-Cola icon) were presented in a random target-color and
had to be adjusted for color to match a gray background, subjects
chose a matching shade of gray in the opposite hue-range to
the thematic-color. To give an example, a subject may adjust a
randomly colored Smurf slightly in the yellow hue, which is the
1This experiment will be of particular importance in the later sections of the
paper. Therefore, we present it in somewhat greater detail than the others
mentioned.
opposite hue to the thematic color of the smurf (blue). This result
is to be expected if the subject sees the randomly colored Smurf
as bluish. Such an effect did not occur in the control condition,
where the same procedure was applied when color-neutral shapes
(e.g., a sock or a golf ball) were presented. Importantly, subjects
in the experimental condition did not choose a shade of gray in
the opposite hue-range to the random target-color of the biasing
shapes, but in that of the thematic-color (the usual color of that
object). Accordingly, experimenters concluded that the subjects’
knowledge of the thematic color slightly altered their perceptual
experience of the target-color. Such results provide support for
the idea that CP actually occurs in color perception. However,
as Stokes rightly points out, the literature in this field is in its
infancy, and few experiments have employed the methodology of
on-line perceptual matching. It is plausible that as the literature
develops, more evidence for CP in different domains of perceptual
experience will emerge. Further evidence of CP includes the
evaluation of steepness of slopes (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999; Durgin
et al., 2009) and spatial perception (Stefanucci and Geuss, 2009)2.
Another experiment demonstrating the online-influence of
concepts on perception was carried out by Winawer et al. (2007).
They presented Russian and English speakers with color samples
of different shades of blue. The experiment was based on different
ways of categorizing shades of “blue” in the two languages: Russian
speakers lexicalize the “blue” category by means of two basic level
terms: “siniy” for darker blues and “goluboy” for lighter blues. In
contrast, English speakers have just one basic-level term (“blue”).
The students were asked to decide as quickly as possible whether
a color presented at the top matched a color on its left or its right
exactly. While all the shades presented were in the same category
of “blue” for English speakers, the colors fell under two different
basic categories for the Russians. Winawer et al. (2007) found
that the Russians—but not the English—had slower reaction times
(RTs) in same-color trials (comparing a darker and a lighter shade
of blue) than in between-colors trials (comparing a light blue and
green).
In addition to the RT results presented above, Carruthers
(2015) reviews an analog experiment (Mo et al., 2011) done
using EEG-data. The experiment relies on mismatch negativity,
measured after 150 ms, indicating the online-influence of early
visual processes. Mo et al. (2011) reported mismatch negativity in
native speakers of Mandarin, who distinguish two shades of green
but not of blue:
“Subjects were required to fixate on a central cross flanked
by two colored squares, andwere asked to respond as swiftly
as possible whenever the cross changed to a circle. The
squares were positioned so that the one on the left would
be represented initially in the right hemisphere whereas
the one on the right would be represented initially in the
left (linguistic) hemisphere. As expected, both hemispheres
showed a mismatch negativity response to changes in the
presented color. But in the right hemisphere there was no
difference in the amplitude of the response to changes of
color within a category (one shade of green changed to
2Some of this evidence has been criticized (see, for example Firestone and
Scholl, 2014, 2015) and is currently a matter of debate.
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another shade of green) versus across categories (a shade
of green changed to a shade of blue). However, in the left
(linguistic/conceptual) hemisphere there was a significant
difference, with a much larger effect for cross-category
changes.” (Report taken from Carruthers, 2015)
Finally, Lupyan (2012, 2015) provides further evidence that
this experiment cannot be interpreted as involving modular
processing of the primary visual cortex. In addition, he offers an
alternative model of how inferential processes produce online-
modifications in perceptual experience, and provides further
examples of CP that are especially related to the interactions
between perception and language processing.
Thus, given the available evidence, which does not involve core
dimensions of social cognition (except for the aspect of race), it is
plausible to accept CP, in principle, for cases of object perception
and color perception. But what about social perception? Can
we plausibly extend the discussion of CP to this area? In this
paper, we aim to show that cognitive penetrability also shapes our
perception of socially relevant information. We focus on a clear
case of perceptual recognition of socially relevant information,
and, specifically, on face-based recognition of basic emotions.
Before proceeding further, however, we must point out that the
claim that our perceptual experience of another person’s emotion
(the “emotion-percept”) is influenced by memorized images or
background beliefs is not entirely new. One line of argument,
mainly inspired by phenomenology, supports the idea of CP of
emotion recognition by arguing that recognizing the emotions
of others is primarily a direct perceptual achievement (Gallagher,
2008; Zahavi, 2011; Krueger, 2012; Stout, 2012). Although we
sympathize with the direct perception claim with respect to basic
emotion recognition (see below and Newen et al., 2015), we want
to develop our argument in this article in such a way as to be
acceptable even for thosewho deny direct perception. If we cannot
presuppose that the content of a percept is rich, i.e., that it involves
rich images as well as conceptual information, it becomes much
more difficult to argue that obvious changes in the recognition of
emotion rely on a change of the percept, instead of a change of
judgment alone. Furthermore, our main claim converges with the
position that emotion, cognition and perception cannot be neatly
separated into distinct modules (Pessoa, 2013; Colombetti, 2014),
which draws support from emotion science. But it is important to
note that the debate about CP would be empty if one were to hold
the view that cognition and perception could not be separated at
all. Thus, we are presupposing a minimally clear separation of the
perceptual experience (be it conceptual or non-conceptual), and
the judgment based on this perceptual experience.
Perceptual Adaptation and the Experience
of Facial Expressions
Given the complex nature and extreme relevance of human
faces in our perceptual life, it is an interesting question whether
recognition of an emotion in a human face is achieved through
a judgment made on the basis of perceptual experience, a purely
perceptual automatic process, or an interaction between both that
admits some degrees of CP. In order to argue for the third of these
options, we start with the question of whether we can perceive
facial expressions as wholes, or whether the evaluation of a facial
expression depends on post-perceptual processes.
The structure of our argument, presented in more detail, runs
as follows: in the first step, we argue for a process of feature
integration in the case of facial expressions of emotions, and claim
that this is a perceptual process. The integration process we have
in mind consists in the gradual combination of facial features
and cues into complex compounds. By discussing perceptual
adaptation to facial expressions of emotions, we show that there
are reasons to think that the resulting compounds, i.e., whole
facial expressions, have to be considered as perceptual states.
Secondly, we argue that such perceptual integration processes can
be influenced by contextual background knowledge, such that we
have to accept that the social perception of emotion involves CP.
Human faces are complex stimuli. They are arguably one of
the richest and most reliable sources of information available to
us in our everyday lives. Two of many examples of phenomena
based on face perception that constitute a significant subset of
the perceptual development of a healthy human subject include
gaze following and joint attention. According to some researchers
(Dunbar, 1998; Adams and Kveraga, 2015), the enormous amount
of information conveyed by human faces is of such relevance
for behavior and social interaction that it is plausible to think
that humans have evolved a dedicated perceptual sub-system for
quickly integrating the various social cues conveyed by a face into
meaningful compounds.
The phenomenon of pareidolia (e.g., Hadjikhani et al., 2009)
provides further evidence for the existence and relevance of an
integrationmechanism for faces: we tend, for instance, to see faces
in natural collections of sand or in cloud formations, because the
integrated patterns are extremely important for humans and can
be easily activated in various situations. Furthermore, the widely
accepted empirical model of face-based recognition of emotion
proposed by Haxby et al. (2000) and Haxby and Gobbini (2011)
involves the following two-step process: (1) the construction of
facial identity and (2) the recognition of facial expressions. The
latter, extended part of recognizing a facial expression, is supposed
to involve such an integration process of core facial features.
Furthermore, recent models analyze normal object perception
as involving Bayesian processes of cue integration and cue
combination (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004), and it is very plausible
that the principles of perception remain the same in the case of
non-social objects and in the case of perceiving emotions in faces
(Newen et al., 2015). Thus, it is very plausible to accept a feature
integration process in the case of recognizing the expression of
an emotion in a face, or recognizing a face in certain perceptual
configurations. However, it is not clear whether faces and facial
expressions as wholes are perceptually processed or not. In fact,
it may be that even if there is a feature integration process at
play, facial expressions are only recognized post-perceptually on
the basis of certain perceptual arrays of lower-level features. Why
should we take this integration process and its results to be
perceptual?
In the present section, we present the first step of our argument
as outlined above. In particular, relying on evidence recently
reviewed in Block (2014), we show that in some cases the
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proposed result of the integration process, i.e., a whole facial
expression, shows perceptual adaptation. Under the assumption
that adaptation is a perceptual process, and that only perceptual
states/contents may adapt, it follows that since facial expressions
as wholes show adaptation, facial expressions as wholes are
perceptually processed. In the next section, we show that the
perceptual integration process of facial expressions may be
influenced by contextual background knowledge and the subject’s
beliefs.
Perceptual adaptation consists in a process where being
exposed to a certain perceptual feature (or set of features),
either repeatedly or for a long time, makes that feature less
likely to be detected in other stimuli. One explanation for this
adaptation is that the firing threshold of the neurons that code
such feature in the perceptual system is raised by prolonged
exposure. Block (2014)3 addresses this phenomenon in the case
of facial expressions of emotion, focusing on the problem of
whether the nature of certain adaptation effects is perceptual or
cognitive.4 Block reviews an experiment by Butler et al. (2008).
In this study, experimenters found that whether a still picture of
a face displaying an emotional expression, ambiguous between
anger and fear, wasmore or less likely to be perceived as expressing
anger or fear depending upon previous exposure to a clearly
fearful or clearly angry face. Most importantly, the effect was
found to persist when the low-level features of the facewere varied,
as long as the emotion expressed was kept constant. This seems to
be a clear case of perceptual adaptation. The exposure to a clearly
angry face raises the threshold for detecting anger-related features
in the subsequently presented ambiguous face, and the opposite
happens in the case of exposure to a clearly fearful face, which is
then perceived as expressing fear.
Concerning this case, Block writes:
“[: : :] can we be sure from introspection that those “looks”-
[fearful/angry] - are really perceptual, as opposed to
primarily the “cognitive phenomenology” of a conceptual
overlay on perception, that is, partly or wholly a matter of a
conscious episode of perceptual judgment rather than pure
perception?” (Block, 2014, p. 7)
Providing an answer to this question is difficult, but Block
thinks that there is reason to reply in the affirmative, and thus
to consider adaptation to facial expression to be a perceptual
phenomenon. The preliminary reason for this conclusion,
according to Block, is that concepts are in general much more
resilient to adaptation than percepts. In particular, Block argues
that in cases of ambiguous pictures, we find a form of multi-stable
perception in which two percepts are alternatively perceived, and
that this switching is the result of perceptual adaptation.
The alternation of the two perceptsworks according to the three
properties of exclusivity (only one percept at a time), inevitability
(the alternation will surely happen at some point), and
randomness (there is no function of duration for each percept).
3Block’s case is framed in the context of Burge’s (2010) discussion of perceptual
attributives. In this paper, we shall try to phrase the discussion inmore general
terms.
4Here, “cognitive” is used in the sense of Block, as concerning conceptual and
propositional states.
Block assumes that correspondent judgments and beliefs are not
subject to an alternation that works according to the same three
properties even in highly conceptually ambiguous situations, and
concludes that there is no such thing as conceptual adaptation.5
As further evidence, Block considers an experiment by
Schwiedrzik et al. (2014), in which subjects were first exposed
to a clearly oriented (either 90°or 0°) grid-like stimulus, and had
to report the orientation. Afterward, they had to evaluate the
direction of tilt of an ambiguously oriented grid-like stimulus
of the same kind. The experimenters found that there was an
adaptation effect in the reports of the orientation of the second
stimulus that depended upon the objective tilt of the first stimulus,
not its reported tilt. In other words, when there was a discrepancy
between the objective and the reported tilt of the first stimulus, the
subsequent adaptation effect was consistent with the former, not
the latter. According to Block, this means that subjects showed an
adaptation effect that depended exclusively on what they actually
saw, not on what they thought they saw. Therefore, adaptation
effects have to be considered to be purely perceptual phenomena.
For present purposes, it is very important to note that
Schwiedrzik et al. (2014) investigated adaptation and the different
phenomenon of priming, in the same experiment, as two opposite
effects. Priming is basically the facilitation of detecting a certain
perceptual feature (or set of features) as triggered by a briefly
presented previous stimulus, called the prime. While adaptation
is exclusively triggered by prolonged exposure to a perceptual
stimulus, priming can be triggered by a prime of the same
or similar perceptual kind as the target, or by a prime that
is semantically related to the target, i.e., a word. Schwiedrzik
et al. (2014) monitored the cortical activity of the subjects and,
consistent with what has just been said, found that adaptation
involved only areas V1 and V2, while priming involved a wider
range of cortical areas. This data shows that adaptation is largely
independent of the subject’s judgment about their experience,
and that the locus of adaptation is mainly in the visual cortical
areas, lending further support to the idea that adaptation must be
considered a purely perceptual phenomenon.
Facial expressions of emotions are complex stimuli, constituted
by specific arrangements of lower-level facial cues like eyebrow
orientation, mouth shape, etc. Hence, if facial expressions of
emotions as a whole show adaptation and, conversely, if a
perceptual system can adapt to facial expressions as a whole, this
means that such a system is capable of detecting lower-level facial
features and integrating them into meaningful compounds,6 even
before corresponding judgments about the emotion expressed
by the faces are formed. If this is correct, it is clear that the
integration-process we just described is sensitive to and is directly
affected by different factors such as lower-level feature saliency
and different kinds of attention. In addition, as we aim to show,
5On this topic it is worth noting that onMroczko-Wa˛sowicz (2015) construal,
“Phenomenal adaptation” is a broader notion that may include non-sensory
states. As she points out (p. 2), however, such a notion is quite different from
the uncontroversial physiological notion of a perceptual adaptation, which
is the one Block employs. We remain neutral with respect to the broader
phenomenon of phenomenal adaptation. Nevertheless, following Block, we
hold that the more constrained phenomenon of perceptual-adaptation does
not involve non-sensory states, which suffices for our argument here.
6This idea is proposed by Adams and Kveraga (2015), see section below.
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the perceptual integration process can be influenced by previously
formed expectations and beliefs. We will now present a case study
inwhich one finds an effect that seems to be just such a case, where
the integration process is influenced by contextual background
knowledge.
Face-Based Recognition of Emotion is
Sensitive to Background Knowledge
The upshot of Block’s argument is that it is plausible to think that
facial expressions of emotions are processed as compounds that
are largely the result of a feature integration process belonging
to perception, insofar as it shows adaptation. The reasons, as
we have seen, are that adaptation to facial expression is at least
partly independent of the lower-level features constituting the
expression, and that concepts and other cognitive features do
not adapt the way percepts do, thus ruling out the possibility
that adaptation depends on higher-level cognitive features. What
adaptation shows is that if the perceptual system is exposed over a
prolonged period to a facial expression of emotion x, the exposure
will affect the integration process such that it will be less likely that
x is recognized as being expressed by a subsequent similar facial
expression. Inotherwords, the integrationprocess that gives rise to
the emotionallymeaningful perceptual compound associatedwith
x is sensitive to stimulus familiarity. In this section, we will present
a case in which the same perceptual integration process seems to
be sensitive to the background knowledge of the subject.We argue
that if this is the case, then we are dealing with the clear and direct
influence of knowledgeonperceptual processing and, plausibly, on
the corresponding perceptual experience. If this is correct, such a
case qualifies as an instance of CP in social perception.
The experiment of Butler et al. (2008) reviewed by Block shows
that perceptual experience of facial expressions, expressions of
emotion in particular, is sensitive to adaptor stimuli that bias
the interpretation toward a different emotion. Moreover, Block’s
discussion points to the fact that this phenomenon may plausibly
be considered purely perceptual. Our case study presents a very
similar effect on the facial expression of emotion, in which
different emotions are recognized as being expressed by the same
face. The experimental condition is actually very similar to Butler
et al. (2008). Themain difference between the two studies is that in
the casewe report, what triggers the shift in the integration process
is not a perceptual adaptor (like another facial expression, as in
the above case), but a subject’s expectations, which are driven by
her background knowledge and activated by a form of conceptual
priming.
The experiment we will discuss was carried out by Carroll
and Russell (1996). The participants had to evaluate the emotion
expressed by a human face. Subjects were presented with
combinations of faces and situations. The target stimuli were still
photographs of posed facial expressions, selected from among
the prototypical facial expressions of fear, anger, or sadness,
as collected in Ekman and Friesen (1976). Such prototypical
facial expressions have the peculiar characteristic of being reliably
evaluated as expressing the same emotion across different subjects
and cultures (Keltner et al., 2003), in cases where no additional
information is available. Situations were provided in the form of
short stories concerning the persons depicted in the stimuli. Such
stories were designed to trigger an emotional response of fear,
anger, or disgust. Subjects were first told the story, and then shown
the picture. They then had to evaluate the emotion expressed by
the face by choosing one of six possible emotion labels.
Carroll and Russell addressed the possibility that providing
contextual information to subjects may alter which emotion is
recognized as being signaled by the prototypical facial expressions.
For simplicity, we present only the pairing of an anger-situation
with a fearful face. The situation was provided in the form of the
following story:
This is a story of a woman who wanted to treat her sister to
the most expensive, exclusive restaurant in their city. Months
ahead, she made a reservation. When she and her sister
arrived, they were told by the maitre that their table would
be ready in 45 minutes. An hour passed, and still no table.
Other groups arrived and were seated after a short wait.
The woman went to the maitre and reminded him of her
reservation. He said that he’d do his best. Ten minutes later,
a local celebrity and his date arrived and were immediately
shown to a table. Another couple arrived and were seated
immediately. The woman went to the maitre, who said that
all the tables were now full and that it might be another hour
before anything was available.7
The researchers found that when presented with such
contextual information, the vast majority of subjects evaluated
the face as signaling anger. When the contextual information
was not presented, however, subjects evaluated the same face as
expressing fear, in accordance with Ekman’s earlier findings.
Can we be sure that this effect demonstrates the influence of
background knowledge on perceptual processes, and that it is not
only a product of modifying our perception-based judgment?8
Assuming, for the reasons discussed above, that the perceptual
system is capable of integrating different low-level facial cues into
meaningful compounds, it is clearly possible that in the present
case, the background knowledge (based on conceptual semantic
priming) provided by the story actually interferes with such an
integration process.9 There are two possible positions that may be
taken in response to this. According to the previously mentioned
approaches inspired by continental phenomenology, emotions are
always directly perceptible in visual experience. If this is the case,
however, the possibility that emotion recognition on the basis of
7Carroll and Russell (1996, p. 208).
8Our notion of Judgment is neutral on how judgments are to be understood.
To be clear, we do not think of judgments as necessarily explicit propositional
states. Rather, we allow for the possibility of implicit and automatic perceptual
judgments.
9This interaction shouldwork in the sameway as in the Butler et al. (2008) case,
albeit in the opposite direction. Adaptation and priming can, in some sense, be
thought of as two sides of the same coin. As Block points out, the formermakes
certain things harder to perceptually process, while the latter makes them
easier. If we have a perceptual integration process that binds together lower-
level features in order to create emotionally meaningful compounds, different
factors can make some of these compounds harder or easier to construct, as
in, respectively, the adaptation and priming cases. Hence, our account has
the advantage of providing a straightforward and unified explanation of both
cases.
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facial expressions is the upshot of a cognitive inferential process
of judgment [i.e., judgment shift (JS)] seems to be excluded.10 On
the other hand, if we accept that emotion recognition may be the
result of a cognitive inferential process, the question that arises is
whether, under certain conditions, the perceptual experience that
underlies such process may bemodified by a subject’s background
knowledge or some other of his cognitive states. We will not
discuss the motivations for adopting either of these positions
here. Instead, we will argue that even if emotions are not directly
perceivable, there are reasons to think that the perceptual process
that leads to emotion recognition on the basis of facial expressions
is penetrated by higher-level cognitive states.
Emotion Recognition: Perceptual
Categories and Judgments
Even if one accepts priming in the case of the facial expression of
emotions, one can still doubt that the evidence provided above
constitutes a clear case of the conceptual priming of perceptual
experience, as opposed to a case of the conceptual priming
of perceptual judgment. We will now propose some additional
reasons to support the perceptual (as opposed to conceptual)
nature of the effect of background information on the recognition
of emotion expressions. Our argument takes the form of an
inference to the best explanation, intended to show that the CP of
perceptual experience provides a better explanation for shifts in
emotion attribution, as compared to the alternative explanation
that involves perceptual judgments.
The phenomenon to be explained is the recognitional shift
that subjects are ready to make when provided with additional
information about the emotion expressed by a face, where that
face is otherwise reliably taken to signal a specific emotion. Our
argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation,11
so we need to put two competing explanations on the table. The
two alternatives we shall consider are CP and JS:
CP: Subjects recognize two different emotions as expressed
by the same face on the basis of two different perceptual
experiences of that face.
JS: Subjects recognize the same face as expressing two
different emotions by forming two different perceptual
judgments on the basis of the very same perceptual
experience.12
There are several things to consider here. First of all, it
is a widely studied phenomenon that, taken out of context,
certain human facial expressions tend to signal one specific
emotion and not others very reliably.13 Secondly, it is known
10See, for example Froese andLeavens (2014) for a discussion of the interaction
between perceptual experience of various physical features (including facial
expressions) and conceptual categories from the perspective of the direct
perception hypothesis.
11This argument echoes some of the considerations above concerning
perceptual adaptation.
12By saying that two experiences could be the same or different, we mean that
they could be token-experiences of the same type or of a different type.
13Here, we do not need to take a stance in the debate between dimensionalist
views of emotion and views that posit basic emotions. For a theory of emotion
that fits nicely with our proposal, see Barlassina and Newen (2014).
that contextual information may alter the kind of emotion that
the face is taken to signal. This happens both in cases of a
change/enrichment of perceptual context (for the visual case,
see Aviezer et al., 2008; Hassin et al., 2013) and in cases of
conceptual priming, as described above. The most important
point, however, is that shifts in emotion recognition do not
happen arbitrarily. Even if a prototypical facial expression of
fear can be taken to signal anger under certain conditions, there
are some constraints that make it highly unlikely that such a
prototypical expression of fear could ever be taken to signal a
radically different emotion, such as joy.14 We shall argue that
these constraints are best explained as perceptual constraints. That
is to say, the different possible emotions that subjects are ready
to recognize as expressed by a particular face depend on the
perceptual integration of different low-level features of the face
itself, like mouth shape, eyebrow orientation, gaze, and so on. We
shall call such features facial cues. According to JS, a subject may
recognize a prototypical facial expression of fear as expressing
anger by forming different judgments on the basis of the same
perceptual experience of a fearful face. If this were the case,
however, we do not see how constraints on emotion recognition
could be introduced in a principledway. If recognizing an emotion
were only amatter of judgment, it would seem possible, regardless
of the epistemic confidence of the subject, to provide enough
background information for the subject to revise his judgment
from one of recognizing fear to one of recognizing joy. This, as per
our assumption, cannot be the case.Onemight argue that there are
indeed such cases of radical JSs. For example, if someone were to
tell you that the person in the target picture has a rare dysfunction
in her facial muscles that forces her to adopt a fearful expression
whenever she is joyful (and vice versa), youmight in the end come
to the correct evaluation of an expression of joy in the fearful face.
This illustrates that we can adapt our judgments, but only at a
later stage. We need to presuppose that—at least at the beginning
of noticing such a special case—the face is rightly recognized as
expressing fear and only subsequently evaluated as expressing joy,
on the basis of background information. After the initially correct
recognition of fear, subsequent judgments that associate the face
with a different emotion can be made without constraint. But if JS
were true, even the initial recognition judgment would be subject
to such unconstrained flexibility, which is implausible in the light
of the strong reliability of emotion recognition. Therefore, we do
not see how a principled way of constraining emotion recognition
can be introduced at the level of pure judgment. This is not to
say that it is in general impossible to introduce such constraints,
only that, as we shall see, it is much more straightforward and
empirically more plausible that the required constraints work at
the level of perception.
Here, one might try to reinforce JS by taking into account
similarity of stimuli, and say that if we are right, then our argument
14Wedo not inquire which specific shifts are allowed andwhich are not; for the
present argument, it is sufficient that emotion recognition changes on the basis
of background information do not happen arbitrarily. However, Carroll and
Russell (1996) review previous findings (e.g., Tomkins, 1962, 1963) showing
that not all background information leads to such a shift. Specifically, the shift
does not happen in the case of joy-related information and an anger signaling
face (p. 17).
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should apply to a whole lot of different cases of perception-based
judgment. For example, one might come up with the following
case:15 there is a picture depicting my very similar-looking twin
(but who is noticeably different in somematters of detail) wearing
a red coat. If one sees the picture and knows that I like to wear red
coats, one might mistakenly recognize me in the picture instead
of my twin. However, the counter argument goes on, this seems to
be a clear case of a mistaken perceptual judgment that requires no
difference in the perceptual experience of the subject.Why cannot
the case above be explained along the same lines? We argue that
the consequences of such an account are less plausible than our
alternative explanation. The problem that the JS explanation faces
comes in the form of a dilemma. The defender of JS might either
(1) propose that the two kinds of stimuli of fearful faces and angry
faces are very similar to each other and (both) very different from
joyful faces, or (2) claim that they are not so similar.
If one goes with (1), and proposes that such stimuli are similar,
then one could say that the similarity and ambiguity between
fearful and angry faces, which they do not share with joyful ones,
could explain why, on the basis of the very same fearful-face
experience, subjects are allowed to activate fear judgments and
anger judgments but not joy judgments: so far, so good. However,
in this case, one faces the serious problem of how to account
for the high reliability of emotion recognition across different
subjects and cultures. Even if one does not buy into the original
basic-emotion framework, the studies conducted by Ekman and
colleagues provide quite compelling reasons to think that the
overwhelmingmajority of subjects16 are at least capable ofmaking
very clear perceptual discriminations between different facial
expressions of the basic emotions: people of different cultures
can reliably distinguish between anger, fear, disgust, sadness,
and surprise, and can reliably combine the judgment with the
facial expression, given a selection of basic emotions. How can a
defender of a JS explanation account for such reliability? If some of
the target faces for basic emotions of fear and anger are supposed
to be very similar, we would expect a higher rate of mistakes from
subjects evaluating which face expresses which emotion.
If, on the other hand, one goes with (2) and claims that
the stimuli are not similar, one needs to accept that, in order
for the judgment to shift from anger to fear, almost all the
perceptual information conveyed by the target fearful face
must be disregarded. But, if this were the case, then the
judgment would no longer be perception-based. Moreover,
if the evidence is disregarded, nothing prevents additional
background information shifting the judgment even further to a
radically different emotion, thus generating the problem of how
to constrain possible judgments discussed above. Thus, if JS fails
to adequately account for the relevant constraints, we need to see
whether CP fares any better.
We want to highlight that with CP, we have the possibility of
collocating the required constraints at the lower perceptual level of
facial-cues. In fact, a straightforward way of accounting for these
constraints is to think of them as a range of shared possible values
of lower-level facial cues for different emotions. According to this
15We are grateful to Peter Brössel for this example.
16See Ekman and Friesen (1971).
view, in order to explain why anger is recognized in a prototypical
fearful face, one needs only suppose that the integration process
in the target case highlights the relevance of the shared features.
Such features are selected on the basis of background information
and expectations, and bound together into an anger-signaling
compound. Hence, we have two distinct perceptual compounds,
a fear-compound in the case of no conceptual priming, and
an anger-compound in the case of conceptual priming. Most
importantly, by explaining the difference on the basis of two
different compounds, we avoid the dilemma depicted above for
the defender of JS. If the integration process is affected before
a compound is formed, we can easily understand the possibility
that only some relevant perceptual information conveyed by the
face is disregarded or given increased saliency. This is precisely
what allows two different compounds to be formed. Hence, the
recognition process need not disregard the whole information
conveyed by the final compound. At the same time, we need
not assume that facial expressions for different emotions need
to be largely similar. In previous sections, we argued that such
compounds are integrated at the level of perception. We therefore
hold that different compounds give rise to different experiences,17
and that on the basis of these different experiences, two different
emotions are recognized.18
Hence, CP provides a natural way of explaining why certain
recognition outputs are allowed and certain others are not.Which
emotion can be recognized in a facial expression depends on
the nature, number, and relevance of shared features across
different facial expressions and on the integration process.
Different outputs of the integration process in turn give rise
to different perceptual experiences. Therefore, CP constitutes a
better explanation than JS for both the reliability and the (limited)
unreliability of emotion recognition across different subjects,
insofar as it provides a principled way of constraining the results
to be expected. Thus, we conclude that Carroll and Russell (1996)
provide a case of CP of perceptual experience, and,more generally,
that the perceptual experience of facial expression of emotions is
sensitive to background knowledge and expectations. In the next
section, we briefly present a recently developed neuro-functional
mechanism that supports our view of emotion recognition. If
we are correct so far, it seems that CP fares better than JS in
accounting for the constraints on possible emotion recognition
on the basis of the same stimulus. In addition, we will present
further evidence offering independently support for CP over JS.
Our strategy is to show that emotion recognition—at least in the
case of basic emotions—can be carried out in large part by the
perceptual system alone. Therefore, since we presented evidence
of particular cases in which background beliefs and knowledge
can influence emotion recognition, that influencemust be exerted
17Whether such difference in the experience is best characterized as a
difference in content or as a difference in the phenomenal character of the two
experiences (or both) is an important open question. However, it goes beyond
the scope of the present paper.
18As Jackendoff (1987) and Prinz (2012) argue, further support for this claim
comes from introspection. Introspectively, we have experiences of integrated
objects (including faces) and not of unbound low-level features. Therefore, we
should situate the locus of conscious perceptual experience after some sort of
integration process has taken place, not before.
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at the level of perception as CP describes, not at the level of
post-perceptual cognitive judgments described by JS.19
Emotion recognition is a complex process that may involve
several perceptual and cognitive mechanisms (see Adolphs, 2002,
for an extensive review). However, there is reason to think, at
least in the case of basic emotions such as fear, anger, joy, etc.,
that a large part of the process is carried out by the perceptual
system alone. First of all, if an organism’s perceptual system
were capable of quickly and automatically processing critical
social stimuli and reliably associating these with appropriate
behavioral responses and other key features such as non-verbal
sounds and lexical labels, this would provide a clear adaptive
advantage for the organism. Evidence for this possibility in
the case of facial expressions of emotions comes from several
sources. One example is research into primates’ facial expressions
(Redican, 1982), which shows that in a comparison of new
world monkeys (prevalently arboreal) and old world monkeys
(prevalently terrestrial), only the latter, which can rely on visual
contact with conspecifics, have developed a complex system
of facial expressions. This supports both the close connection
between facial expressions of emotions and vision and the social
value of perceptual integration of facial expressions of emotions
(Adams and Kveraga, 2015).
Further interesting evidence for the perceptual nature of
emotion recognition comes from computer models (discussed
in Adolphs, 2002) designed to achieve comparable performance
to humans in evaluating when two facial expressions belong to
a different emotional category (even when the structure of the
two stimuli is very similar), but that cannot rely on any form of
conceptual knowledge about emotions. Moreover, evidence from
perceptual priming studies (Carroll and Young, 2005) shows
that facilitation effects on emotion recognition are sensitive to
the emotional category of the primes (e.g., anger vs. disgust),
not only to the positive or negative valence of the emotions. In
combination, the evidence discussed here provides support for
a quick and reliable perceptual process of emotion recognition
that relies on clearly separated perceptual categories that may
not always need conceptual knowledge. Hence, if emotion
recognition is achieved on the basis of a quick process that relies
on discrete perceptual categories, this undermines the claim that
cognitive judgment plays a strong role in emotion recognition.
Now, if emotions are categorized at the level of perception, shifts
in categorization that depend on contextual information (such
as those discussed in the previous section) seem to be plausibly
explained as special cases, in which background knowledge
interferes directly with the perceptual process that leads form
feature detection to perceptual categorization, in accordance
with CP.
A further consideration in favor of CP is that of explanatory
parsimony. If one accepts CP in color perception (Levin and
Banaji, 2006), an explanation of the form of CP needs to already be
available. Critically, the color case has many relevant similarities
with Carroll and Russell (1996). In both studies, target stimuli
were of the same broad perceptual kind, namely human faces.
19The evidence we present below is in line with a form of direct perception for
basic emotions.
In both studies, relevant background knowledge was triggered by
conceptual information (a story and a verbal label respectively).
However, recall that in Levin and Banaji (2006), subjects were
required to perform a perceptual matching task, which rules out
the possibility that the influence of racial categories could have
been exerted at the level of judgment. Hence, it seems that a
CP explanation could account for both cases, whereas JS could
account only for the emotion study. If we admit that background
knowledge can interfere with the perceptual processing of certain
facial features, such as skin color, why should we not favor the
same line of explanation (CP) in the case of perceptual processing
of other facial features, such as expressions of emotion?20
To conclude this section, we wish to examine a final worry
based on the claim that the phenomenon described Carroll and
Russell (1996) depends on a shift in the subject’s attention, and
that it is therefore not a case of CP. This strategy is the one adopted
by Pylyshyn to rule out most cases of CP. We need to show that it
does not apply in the present case. Pylyshyn (1999) thought that
attention shifts exclude CP because the functional role of attention
is basically to select (or gate) a subset of the available perceptual
information as an input to EV. If this were always the case, a
shift in attention would be a pre-perceptual effect amounting to
a shift in the input, similar to looking in a different direction in
order to gather more information about a stimulus. The resulting
perceptual experience would still be different, but it would be
causally dependent on such input shift, and this would not be an
interesting case of CP. However, we now know that attention shifts
can have different effects while the input remains stable.
Here, we have two things to say to counter Pylyshyn’s view.
First, it is questionable whether the role that Pylyshyn assigns to
attention is the correct or the only possible one. Views of attention
differ significantly in terms of the functional role they assign to
attention and its underlying processes.21 Therefore, it is not so
clear that the scope of attentional modulation of perception can
be constrained in such a way as to rule out the possibility that
attention affects the whole scope of visual processing, including
EV. Second, we have seen that if we accept that facial expressions
as wholes are perceptually integrated into complex compounds
from lower-level facial cues, this must happen after the lower-
level cues that constitute such compounds have been processed.
Hence, an attentional shift on a facial expression can either affect
how the features are integrated, or how the resulting compound is
processed. In both cases, it would be an effect that alters perceptual
processing itself, not a pre-perceptual effect that changes the input,
as Pylyshyn conceived of it. Thus, even if one wishes to call
this an attentional shift,22 it is nevertheless a shift that happens
within perceptual processing, not before. Hence, the case does not
meet Pylyshyn’s requirement of attention changing the input to
perception. Consequently, it does not undermine CP.23
20We know from the previous section that facial expressions are perceptually
processed as wholes.
21See Mole (2011) for a radically different view of attention, and see Mole
(2015) and Stokes (2014) for a discussion of attention and its relation to
cognitive penetrability.
22More on this below.
23We would just like to mention that a CP explanation is consistent with
very recent models of emotion recognition and facial expressions such as
Carruthers (2015) and Haxby and Gobbini (2011).
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The Mechanism: Neural Shortcuts,
Compound Cues Integration, and Social
Vision
So far, we have proposed two reasons for taking the experiment
conducted by Carroll and Russell (1996) as evidence for the
cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The first is
that facial expressions of emotion show adaptation, and should
therefore be considered as perceptually integrated compounds.
The second is that CP is a better explanation for the constrained
shifts that can happen in emotion recognition on the basis of
background knowledge. However, we have not yet proposed a
plausible candidate mechanism that supports such penetration
effects.
Before discussing a candidate, we should outline the framework
for the search for such a mechanism. It is an open question
whether there is only one mechanism that accounts for top-
down influences on perceptual integration processes. We have
argued elsewhere that we need to distinguish different types
of CP (Vetter and Newen, 2014) that may reasonably be
assumed to have different underlying mechanisms. We want
to describe two routes of top-down influences that are not
the preferential candidates for explaining our core example,
before outlining a plausible candidate. Top-down influences on
perceptual processes may be produced because newly activated
beliefs shift our attention and thus relevantly modify the sensory
input. Although, as we mentioned above, if attention is conceived
differently from Pylyshyn’s account, it may sometimes be a
possible mediator of CP, this does not seem to be what happens
in the case of contextual background stories (see above). The
important candidates as mechanisms of top-down attention
modulation are reviewed in Baluch and Itti (2011). A second
consideration is that background knowledge is conceptual, and
needs to be transformed into a perceptual format before it
can causally influence purely perceptual processes. Macpherson
(2012) proposes that the top-down modulation of perceptual
processes can only be indirect, modulated by activating the
relevant imagery. This, however, would only be true if conceptual
representations were absolutely separated from imagery and
sensory representations. This traditional view of concepts as
purely cognitive has been radically called into question by
recent data and theories, including embodied concept formation
(Barsalou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 2003; Pulvermüller and Fadiga,
2010). Thus, it remains a reasonable option to look for a
mechanism that involves direct causal top-down-influences and
that may not be purely attentional.
Fortunately for us, there is already a theory available that
posits such a top-down mechanism in the case of stimuli
that have relevance for social interaction, a paradigmatic class
of which is human faces. Moreover, this theory has both
a functional component and a neurophysiological model of
implementation. The model in question is that of compound
social-cues integration (Adams et al., 2010; Adams and Nelson,
2011; Adams and Kveraga, 2015), which relies on the studies
of Bar (2003, 2009). According to this view, the anatomy
of the visual system supports quick recruitment of higher-
level cognitive areas, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),
before a visual stimulus is recognized.24 This is possible
because the retinal projection of a visual stimulus activates
a specific “neural-shortcut,” the magnocellular-pathway (M-
pathway), mostly identifiable with the dorsal visual stream.25
The M-pathway is known to quickly26 project coarse information
about the stimulus to the associative areas of OFC. OFC, in
turn, presents feedback projections to areas in the ventral stream,
including recognition areas in the infero-temporal cortex (IT).
Of course, we cannot make inferences from neuroanatomical to
functional mechanisms easily. Nevertheless, the existence ofmany
specific and very quick feedback connections in the brain shows
at least that nothing in neuroanatomy prevents the occurrence
of a process of CP such as the one described above. Moreover,
the feedback loop from prefrontal areas (typically associated with
reasoning and conceptual knowledge) to visual areas seems to
be a plausible preliminary candidate for a neural correlate of
CP.
Provided that neuroanatomical characteristics of the brain
support the idea of amodulation of perceptual integration exerted
by background knowledge, Adams and Kveraga (2015) argue that
different social cues, such as gender, age, posture, etc., are relevant
to such perceptual integration processes, which they call social
vision. In previous sections, we have already provided a sketch
of their model, which claims that one of the main tasks of vision
is precisely to deliver such integrated meaningful compounds.
According to these authors, the plausibility of the idea is
supported by evolutionary and everyday considerations about
the importance for human beings and other animals of being
able to quickly integrate as much socially relevant information as
possible. For the purposes of the present paper, however, we need
not delve into much detail about the social-vision view. It suffices
for our argument that facial-cues, such as eyebrow orientation,
mouth shape, gaze direction, and perhaps other facially evident
cues such as gender and age, are perceptually integrated together
in order to form meaningful emotion-signaling compounds.
If one admits that such integration is possible at the level
of the face, then our considerations concerning adaptation
and principled constraints on emotion recognition should be
enough to show that under certain conditions, the integration
process is sensitive to background knowledge, expectations and,
possibly, to other high-level cognitive features. We are aware
that this is a somewhat unusual way of arguing for CP. We
think, however, that perception is a much more dynamic and
integrative process that it is described to be in the traditional
modular model, and that the evidence we have presented here
supports this view. Hence, we conclude that the boundary
between perception and cognition should be at least partially
blurred.
Conclusion and Outlook
Cognitive penetration is not only a plausible claim about the
perception of objects and physical scenes, but also about the social
24See also Bar (2003, 2009) and Kveraga et al. (2009, 2011).
25See Milner and Goodale (1995).
26As quick as 80 ms.
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perception of emotion. The results presented here indicate that we
should even go further, and start to investigate the extent to which
the perceptual recognition of other social and mental phenomena
is shaped by CP. We suggest that face-based recognition of
emotion is only one basic component of the most important
integration process for humans, namely the integration on the
level of person perception (Macrae and Quadflieg, 2010). Person
perception is accompanied by an impression formation that
should also be explained by a systematic interaction of bottom-
up and top-down processes, constituting a person impression
(Newen, 2015). Thus, we suggest future work investigating
whether CP also holds for the formation of a complex person
impression based on perception. One further interesting upshot
of this line of investigation is that perceptual processes may
essentially rely on the same type of bottom-up and top-down
mechanisms, despite the fact that physical objects like trees and
social objects like human faces provide us with radically different
inputs, and despite the observation that some social stimuli are
processed in highly functionally specialized brain areas, like FFA
(fusiform face-area) for faces.
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